

EXHIBIT K

THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS OF THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION

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In the Matter of Arbitration between
SPENCER MEYER,

Claimant,

Les Weinstein

-against-

AAA No. 01-18-0002-1956

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Respondent.

- - - - - x

October 24, 2019

9:30 a.m.

BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP

55 Hudson Yards

New York, New York 10001

B E F O R E:

LES WEINSTEIN, The Arbitrator

- - -

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ALSO PRESENT:
SPENCER MEYER, CLAIMANT
ERIC LIPMAN, ESQUIRE, UBER
KALEIGH WOOD, PARALEGAL

1 [REDACTED] - Direct

2 we compete for drivers.

3 Q. That's why it's important, you said
4 to give drivers more money?

5 A. I said that driver incentives are a
6 way for us to run a more efficient
7 marketplace.

8 Q. I thought you said something about
9 giving drivers extra money.

10 A. I said that the way that drivers
11 can earn extra money is by completing a
12 driver incentive, but the goal of driver
13 incentives is to help Uber run a more
14 efficient marketplace on behalf of the
15 drivers and riders that we serve.

16 Q. Just to make sure that I have the
17 jargon down at the beginning, marketplace
18 means the Uber platform, marketplace of
19 riders and drivers?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. You oversee driver surge?

22 A. I do, yes.

23 Q. Can you just generally explain to
24 us what driver surge is?

25 A. Sure. Driver surge is the way that --

1 [REDACTED] - Direct

2 Q. The driver can't, in any way,
3 signal a price to riders through the Uber
4 app, correct?

5 A. That's right.

6 Q. Let's talk about drivers adjusting
7 fares for riders.

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. Can drivers adjust the upfront
10 pricing by request to Uber?

11 A. Can drivers adjust the upfront
12 fare? So can drivers adjust the upfront fare
13 that riders receive before the trip?

14 Q. Yes. That's my question.

15 A. Not to my knowledge, no.

16 Q. That upfront fare is based on city
17 specific rates, correct?

18 A. There are many things that go into
19 the rider upfront price and the rates, as you
20 say, are what we previously said we will pay
21 drivers on a per mile, per minute and minimum
22 basis and that forms the cost basis on which
23 we are setting the upfront price. The good
24 business, hopefully, takes more money from
25 the buyers than they give to their cost of

1 [REDACTED] - Direct

2 ARBITRATOR WEINSTEIN: Mr. Feldman,
3 I don't want to limit you, but is this
4 not -- we're beating a horse we are
5 afraid may be dead or may not be dead?

6 MR. FELDMAN: It's dead now. I
7 will move on, Mr. Weinstein.

8 THE WITNESS: I didn't see the
9 beating, but it sounds bad.

10 Q. Let's turn to page 7. This is the
11 part I'm most interested in actually.

12 So page 7, 4.1 talks about fare
13 calculation in your payment, which I
14 understand is the driver's payment.

15 Do you see that?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. The first sentence says, You are
18 entitled to charge a fare for each instance
19 of completed transportation services provided
20 to a user that are obtained via the Uber
21 services, a defined term fare, where such
22 fare is calculated based upon a base fare
23 amount, plus distance, parenthetically, as
24 determined by company using location-based
25 services enabled through the device, end

1 [REDACTED] - Direct

2 A. Thousands.

3 Q. You can set Meyer Exhibit 50 aside.

4 Let's talk about another potential
5 option provided to riders that we touched on
6 earlier.

7 If you take the example of the ride
8 to the airport, we talked earlier that if
9 surge pricing were in effect and a \$30 ride
10 was surging, it was \$40, that there wasn't
11 another option on that product at that time
12 with a different ETA without surge, correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Would that be technically feasible?

15 A. What is that?

16 Q. Offering a no surge product with a
17 longer ETA.

18 A. So anything is technically
19 feasible. That specific product, especially
20 in sparse areas, would become incredibly
21 difficult to deliver from a product
22 prospective and the reason for that is we
23 have very, very few cars waiting around Mr.
24 Weinstein's house and if, let's say, one of
25 those drivers opted into this no surge

1 [REDACTED] - Direct

2 product, they would get snapped up at too
3 high of rates, at too fast a rate relative to
4 all the other people in Mr. Weinstein's
5 neighborhood. That would mean that having
6 had them all locked in, all of the cars would
7 be exhausted and every subsequent rider in
8 the neighborhood, including Mr. Weinstein,
9 would now see a very high ETA, from which we
10 could not recover. There would be no
11 choices, all the ETAs would be very bad and
12 everyone would have a bad experience until
13 more drivers flowed back in.

14 Q. The reason that would move so
15 quickly, that product, is because riders
16 would be very interested in that option,
17 right?

18 A. Riders would have the same level of
19 interest, there are just too many of them.

20 Q. What did you mean by that?

21 A. So the imbalance comes from having
22 too many riders show up relative to the
23 number of drivers in that neighborhood and
24 without -- if half, more of those drivers
25 opted into a no surge product, riders in that